Working Papers
Coalition stability with complementary goodsRevision requested by the Canadian Journal of Economics
Summary: Studies the formation and stability of coalitions among firms whose products are consumed together. The analysis asks when coordination among complementors is self-enforcing and how stable coalitions affect prices and market outcomes.
Interchange fees in payment networks: implications for prices, profits, and welfare
Summary: Develops a two-sided model of payment-card markets to examine how interchange fees and rewards shape consumer and merchant prices, platform profits, card use, and welfare. The analysis identifies when fee caps help card and cash users and when they improve payment choices.
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper Series, 26-29
Peer effects and worker visibility in team production: evidence from NBA rookies
Summary: Uses the quasi-random assignment of NBA rookies to teams to study how peer quality affects early-career opportunities. Stronger teams reduce playing time, performance, and later earnings, revealing a visibility penalty that can outweigh positive peer spillovers.
Breadth, depth, and coalition stability in complementary oligopoly
Summary: Extends the coalition analysis by distinguishing breadth across complementary components from depth among rival firms within each component. It characterizes when stable coordination lowers prices while preserving sufficient within-component competition.
Optimal VAT thresholds in a production chain
Summary: Studies how the VAT registration threshold should be set when firms are linked through a production chain. The project examines how registration, sourcing, and production decisions change the standard trade-off between tax revenue and administrative and compliance costs.
The rise and fall of disintermediated platform lending
Summary: Examines the forces behind the growth and decline of lending platforms that connect borrowers and investors without traditional bank intermediation. The project focuses on how platform incentives and market structure affect the viability of disintermediated lending.
The architecture of voluntary standards in complementary oligopoly
Summary: Studies how a voluntary interoperability standard shapes participation across complementary product categories (breadth) and competing firms within each category (depth). It characterizes stable adoption architectures and shows that privately stable participation can differ from the welfare-preferred depth, with implications for standards governance.